PHILLIPINE SEA
From June through October 1944 American naval forces conducted a critical campaign in the Philippine Sea which destroyed Japan's naval air power and established a strategic position to advance toward Japan for the Allies. The Philippine Sea Battle known as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot” demonstrated American carrier and aircraft superiority by destroying Japanese air forces to protect Saipan, Guam and Leyte island invasions. The campaign undermined Japan’s Pacific defense capabilities while enabling further Allied military operations. Charles Jones' collection of WWII model warships in the Fleet of Freedom initiative represents the U.S. Fifth Fleet’s iconic vessels that achieved dominance in the Philippine Sea with superior naval power, air superiority, and logistical precision. Discover the essential battles and deep sacrifices that led to Allied victory by the end of 1945.
Introduction to PHILLIPPINE SEA: Pacific Turning Point
The Battle of the Philippine Sea, fought on June 19–20, 1944, stands as a defining moment in the Pacific Theater of World War II. Known as the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" for the devastating losses inflicted on Japanese air forces, this naval engagement crippled Japan’s carrier-based aviation and secured the U.S. path to the Mariana Islands. This comprehensive article, prepared for the Fleet of Freedom Project, examines the battle’s strategic context, key events, perspectives from both American and Japanese sides, broader implications, and enduring lessons. Drawing on historical accounts, it provides a detailed analysis of the battle’s significance and its role in shaping the war’s outcome.
PHILLIPPINE SEA ships
The Phillippine Sea campaign centered on aircraft carriers where their support vessels and escorts played a decisive role in determining the battle's outcome. The following list summarizes the principal ships engaged in the battle as detailed by Chesneau, Whitley, and Bagnasco.
historical & strategic Context
By mid-1944, the United States had shifted the Pacific War’s momentum through its island-hopping campaign. Under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the U.S. Pacific Fleet had neutralized Japanese strongholds in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, setting its sights on the Marianas—Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. These islands were critical for their proximity to Japan (approximately 1,500 miles) and their potential as bases for B-29 Superfortress bombers, which could strike Japan’s home islands. Capturing the Marianas would also breach Japan’s inner defensive perimeter, disrupting its control over the western Pacific.
Japan, facing mounting losses, recognized the Marianas’ strategic importance. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) developed Operation A-Go, a desperate plan to lure the U.S. Fifth Fleet into a decisive battle. Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, commanding the Mobile Fleet, aimed to combine carrier-based aircraft with land-based planes from the Marianas to overwhelm the Americans. However, Japan faced severe challenges: its pilot training programs were depleted, producing inexperienced aviators, and its industrial capacity lagged, limiting aircraft quality and quantity. The A6M Zero, once dominant, was outclassed by newer U.S. aircraft like the F6F Hellcat.
The U.S. Fifth Fleet, led by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, was a juggernaut. Task Force 58, under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, comprised 15 fleet carriers, seven battleships, 21 cruisers, 69 destroyers, and nearly 1,000 aircraft. Ozawa’s Mobile Fleet, by contrast, had nine carriers, five battleships, 13 cruisers, 28 destroyers, and about 450 carrier-based aircraft, supplemented by 300 land-based planes. The U.S. advantage in pilot training, radar technology, and fleet coordination set the stage for a lopsided confrontation.
Japanese Perspective on Strategy
From the Japanese viewpoint, Operation A-Go was a high-stakes gamble born of necessity. Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, believed the Marianas were Japan’s last chance to halt the U.S. advance before the war reached its home islands. Japanese planners overestimated their land-based air forces’ effectiveness, expecting them to weaken the U.S. fleet before Ozawa’s carriers engaged. However, internal challenges undermined these plans. The IJN’s First Air Fleet, based in the Marianas, was decimated by U.S. pre-invasion airstrikes, reducing its contribution. Japanese commanders also underestimated U.S. radar capabilities and the Hellcat’s superiority, clinging to outdated tactics from earlier victories like Pearl Harbor.
Prelude to Battle
In early June 1944, U.S. forces launched Operation Forager, the invasion of the Marianas. Saipan was the first target, with landings beginning on June 15. To soften Japanese defenses, Task Force 58 conducted massive airstrikes, destroying over 200 land-based aircraft. These raids exposed Japan’s weakened air forces and disrupted Ozawa’s plans to coordinate carrier and land-based attacks. Japanese reconnaissance, hampered by limited scout planes, struggled to locate the U.S. fleet, while American submarines and signals intelligence provided Spruance with precise information on Ozawa’s movements.
On June 18, U.S. scout planes detected Ozawa’s fleet approaching from the west. Spruance, wary of Japanese deception tactics (reminiscent of Midway), positioned Task Force 58 to protect the Saipan invasion force while preparing to engage. Ozawa, believing his longer-range aircraft gave him an advantage, planned to strike from beyond U.S. reach, exploiting what he perceived as American overconfidence.
Japanese Optimism and Miscalculations
Japanese commanders entered the battle with cautious optimism. Ozawa, a seasoned tactician, believed his fleet’s range and the element of surprise could offset numerical disadvantages. The IJN’s doctrine emphasized decisive battles, and officers like Rear Admiral Sueo Obayashi, commanding the Carrier Division, saw the engagement as an opportunity to reverse Japan’s fortunes. However, these hopes were based on flawed assumptions. Japanese intelligence underestimated Task Force 58’s size and overestimated the effectiveness of their own air forces. The loss of experienced pilots in prior battles, such as the Solomons campaign, left Japan reliant on novices who lacked the skills for complex carrier operations.
Strategic Context Leading to the Philippine Sea
The campaign against Rabaul in late 1943 served as a pivotal precursor to the Battle of the Philippine Sea, shaping the broader Allied strategy in the Pacific Theater. Under the umbrella of Operation Cartwheel, Allied commanders sought to isolate and diminish Japanese strongholds, with Rabaul emerging as a critical target due to its role as a major naval and air base. The series of air raids, particularly those conducted in November 1943, involved a combination of carrier-based aircraft from Task Force 38 and land-based planes from the U.S. Fifth Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Royal New Zealand Air Force. These attacks targeted Rabaul’s heavily fortified Simpson Harbour, known for its resemblance to Pearl Harbor, as well as its multiple airfields, including Lakunai, Vunakanau, Rapopo, Tobera, and Borpop. The Japanese had fortified the area with 367 anti-aircraft guns and a sophisticated radar network providing up to 90 miles of early warning, making the raids a significant challenge. The success of these operations in November, despite adverse weather conditions and heavy losses—such as the downing of eight B-25 bombers and nine P-38 fighters during the November 2 raid—marked a turning point. This effort weakened Japanese naval presence, particularly after the damaging of the cruiser Agano and the sinking of the destroyer Suzunami, and protected the Allied amphibious landings on Bougainville. The strategic neutralization of Rabaul’s threat allowed Allied forces to shift their focus northward, laying the groundwork for the larger confrontation in the Philippine Sea in June 1944. The experience gained from these raids, including the innovative use of low-altitude strafing runs, enhanced Allied tactical proficiency and confidence in engaging fortified land targets.
Impact on Allied Naval Operations and Confidence
The success of the Rabaul raids in late 1943 had a direct and significant impact on Allied naval operations and the strategic approach they employed in the Battle of the Philippine Sea several months later. The ability to project air power from the sea, as demonstrated by the coordinated strikes from Task Force 38 and land-based aircraft from Green Island and other locations in the Solomon Sea, played a crucial role in neutralizing the Japanese naval base at Rabaul. This was particularly important given the extensive anti-aircraft defenses and multiple airfields that protected the Simpson Harbour at Rabaul. The effectiveness of these raids not only demonstrated the potential of carrier-based air strikes in overcoming seemingly impregnable defenses but also provided a boost to the confidence and capabilities of the Allied naval forces. Admiral William Halsey, who had previously underestimated the difficulty of such an operation, led the November 1943 raids that significantly damaged Rabaul’s capacity as a naval base, a factor that contributed to the success of the Allied naval operations at the Philippine Sea battle. The protection of the Allied amphibious landings on Bougainville during these raids, where 14,000 Marines established a beachhead despite Japanese counterattacks, underscored the importance of air superiority, a principle that was fully realized in the Philippine Sea victory. Furthermore, the experience gained in planning and executing these raids enhanced the tactical skills and operational readiness of the Allied naval air groups, which were crucial in the subsequent carrier engagements in the Philippine Sea, leading to a decisive victory that shifted the balance of power in the Pacific.
Role in the Overall Shift in the Pacific Theater
The Rabaul raids also played a significant role in shifting the dynamics in the Pacific Theater, setting the stage for major engagements like the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The campaign to isolate and weaken Rabaul, a key Japanese stronghold, began in earnest in October 1943 under the command of General George Kenney. The initial raid on October 18, 1943, by 50 B-25 Mitchell bombers, though hampered by poor weather, marked the beginning of a series of air attacks that intensified in November. These raids not only reduced Rabaul’s ability to serve as a supply and reinforcement point for other Japanese operations in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea but also forced the Japanese to divert significant naval resources to its defense. The commitment of Japanese reinforcements from Truk, following the November raids, highlighted the strain on Japanese resources and their overextended supply lines. This was a critical development that contributed to the success of the Allied operations in the Pacific, including the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The pacification campaign that followed, starting on December 17, 1943, with land-based U.S. Navy and Marine Corps bombers, further cemented Rabaul’s status as a shadow of its former self, leading to its eventual neutralization as a threat. This shift in the balance of power in the Pacific, facilitated by the Rabaul raids, allowed the Allies to focus on other strategic objectives, including the Philippines, and set the stage for the decisive naval and air battles that would define the end of the war in the Pacific.
The Battle Unfolds
June 19, 1944: The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot
The battle commenced on June 19 with Ozawa launching four major air raids, totaling 373 aircraft, against Task Force 58. The Japanese aimed to overwhelm U.S. defenses with sheer numbers, but the attacks were poorly coordinated. U.S. radar detected the incoming waves 50–70 miles out, allowing Hellcat squadrons to intercept them far from the fleet. The F6F Hellcat, with its 2,000-horsepower engine and six .50-caliber machine guns, outmatched the Zero’s agility with superior speed and durability. American anti-aircraft fire, enhanced by proximity-fused shells, created a lethal defensive barrier.
The result was catastrophic for Japan. Of the 373 planes launched, 243 were shot down, with many others damaged or lost to operational failures. U.S. losses were minimal—29 aircraft and no ships. The slaughter, dubbed the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot," was a testament to American technological and organizational superiority.
Key factors included:
- **Pilot Disparity**: U.S. pilots, averaging two years of training and combat experience, outperformed Japan’s novices, many of whom had less than six months of training.
- **Defensive Coordination**: Task Force 58’s carrier groups operated in tight formations, maximizing radar-directed intercepts and anti-aircraft fire.
- **Tactical Restraint**: Spruance’s decision to keep his fleet near Saipan forced Japanese planes into predictable attack paths, exposing them to Hellcat ambushes.
From the Japanese perspective, June 19 was a disaster. Pilots reported overwhelming opposition, with Hellcats seemingly everywhere. Communication breakdowns and poor coordination between carrier and land-based units compounded the chaos. Ozawa, aboard the Taiho, initially underestimated the losses, believing his forces could regroup for another strike.
Submarine Strikes
The day’s losses extended beyond aircraft. At 9:10 a.m., USS Albacore torpedoed the carrier Taiho, Ozawa’s flagship. A single torpedo ignited gasoline vapors, and poor damage control led to a massive explosion, sinking the ship. Ozawa transferred his flag to a cruiser, disrupting command continuity. Later, USS Cavalla sank the carrier Shokaku, a Pearl Harbor veteran, with three torpedoes. These losses reduced Japan’s carrier strength by a third and underscored the IJN’s vulnerability to U.S. submarines.
June 20, 1944: The Counterstrike
On June 20, Ozawa withdrew westward, hoping to regroup and draw the U.S. fleet into range of land-based aircraft. Spruance, cautious of overextending, delayed pursuit until scout planes located Ozawa’s fleet at 3:00 p.m., 300 miles away. Mitscher launched a daring strike of 216 aircraft at 4:00 p.m., knowing the planes would return after dark—a risky proposition for carrier landings.
The U.S. strike hit Ozawa’s fleet at dusk, sinking the carrier Hiyo and damaging the carriers Zuikaku and Chiyoda. Japanese defenses, depleted by June 19’s losses, downed only 20 U.S. planes. The returning American pilots faced a perilous night recovery. Mitscher, prioritizing his aviators, ordered carriers to illuminate their decks, risking submarine attack. Despite crashes and ditchings, 80 of the 100 planes that failed to land safely were recovered, with minimal loss of life.
From the Japanese side, the June 20 strike was a final blow. Ozawa, now aboard the Zuikaku, realized his air forces were effectively destroyed. Japanese crews fought valiantly, but the loss of Hiyo and the damage to other ships left the Mobile Fleet crippled. The IJN’s morale plummeted as survivors recounted the relentless U.S. assault.
Strategic Outcomes
The Battle of the Philippine Sea was a decisive U.S. victory. Japan lost three carriers (Taiho, Shokaku, Hiyo), 633 aircraft, and over 2,000 personnel, including irreplaceable pilots. The U.S. lost 123 aircraft and 109 personnel, with no ships sunk. Task Force 58 remained intact, enabling the capture of Saipan (July 1944), Tinian (August 1944), and Guam (August 1944). These islands became B-29 bases, intensifying strategic bombing of Japan in 1945.
For Japan, the battle marked the end of its carrier air arm as a viable force. The loss of pilots and aircraft was insurmountable, forcing the IJN to rely on kamikaze tactics in later battles like Leyte Gulf. The defeat also exposed Japan’s strategic vulnerabilities, as the Marianas’ fall brought the war to its doorstep. Japanese commanders, including Toyoda and Ozawa, faced harsh criticism for underestimating U.S. capabilities, though some argued the battle’s outcome was inevitable given Japan’s resource constraints.
Broader Implications
The battle reshaped the Pacific War’s trajectory. The U.S. Navy’s dominance ensured control of the western Pacific, facilitating the Philippines’ liberation and Iwo Jima’s capture. The Marianas’ B-29 bases enabled firebombing campaigns and, ultimately, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The battle also highlighted the shift from battleship-centric to carrier-centric naval warfare, with air power proving decisive.
From a Japanese perspective, the defeat deepened internal divisions. Some naval officers advocated for conserving forces for a final stand, while others pushed for aggressive counterattacks. Civilians in Japan, initially shielded from the battle’s full impact, grew anxious as U.S. air raids intensified. The loss of the Marianas also strained Japan’s economy, as the islands were key to its supply lines.
Related Topics and Historical References
Technological Advancements
The battle showcased U.S. technological superiority. The F6F Hellcat, introduced in 1943, was designed to counter the Zero, with a 60% kill ratio in 1944. Radar, particularly the CXAM and SK models, provided early warning, while proximity-fused anti-aircraft shells increased lethality. Japan’s failure to innovate—relying on the outdated Zero and lacking effective radar—sealed its fate.
Pilot Training Disparities
The U.S. Navy’s pilot training program, producing 60,000 aviators by 1944, emphasized combat tactics and survival skills. Japan’s program, hampered by fuel shortages and high attrition, graduated pilots with minimal flight hours. Historical records, such as the diary of Japanese pilot Saburo Sakai, reveal the frustration of veterans training ill-prepared recruits.
Submarine Warfare
U.S. submarines, often overlooked, were pivotal. The sinkings of Taiho and Shokaku demonstrated the effectiveness of the Gato-class submarines’ Mark 18 torpedoes. Japanese anti-submarine measures, reliant on outdated sonar, failed to counter this threat. The U.S. Navy’s submarine campaign, detailed in Clay Blair’s *Silent Victory*, crippled Japan’s naval and merchant fleets.
Leadership Dynamics
Spruance’s cautious approach contrasted with Mitscher’s aggressive tactics, sparking debate among historians like Samuel Eliot Morison. Japanese leadership, fragmented by rivalries between Toyoda and Ozawa, lacked cohesion. Post-war interviews, such as those in the *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, highlight Ozawa’s regret over misjudging U.S. strength.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea, while widely studied, includes several lesser-known details that highlight its complexity and human elements. For instance, the battle saw the combat debut of the U.S. Navy’s SB2C Helldiver dive bomber, which, despite its troubled development and early mechanical issues, contributed to strikes against Japanese carriers. Another overlooked aspect is the role of African American sailors, such as those serving on USS Hornet, who, despite segregation, performed critical roles in ammunition handling and damage control under intense combat conditions. On the Japanese side, the carrier Taiho’s sinking was exacerbated by a junior officer’s decision to ventilate gasoline vapors, a fatal error not widely publicized in post-war accounts. Additionally, the battle marked one of the first uses of the U.S. Navy’s “CIC” (Combat Information Center), a precursor to modern command-and-control systems, which integrated radar and communications to coordinate air defenses with unprecedented efficiency. These details, often overshadowed by the battle’s broader narrative, underscore the technological, human, and organizational intricacies that shaped its outcome.
Decision Matrix: Phillippine sea
| Decision Point | Options Considered | Decision Made | Key Factors | Outcomes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Allied Fleet Positioning | 1. Aggressive westward pursuit 2. Defensive Saipan coverage 3. Divided force |
Defensive coverage near Saipan | - Protect invasion forces - Fear of Japanese "end run" - Limited night combat capability |
"Great Marianas Turkey Shoot"; 476 Japanese aircraft lost vs 123 US |
| Japanese Carrier Strategy | 1. Close-range engagement 2. Long-range strikes 3. Preserve carriers |
Long-range attacks using Guam airfields | - Outranged US aircraft - Land-based air support - Preserve fleet |
Ineffective strikes; exposed pilot inexperience |
| US Submarine Deployment | 1. Attack immediately 2. Track and report 3. Form wolfpacks |
Track and report first (USS Flying Fish/Seahorse) | - Maintain contact - Preserve element of surprise - Intel for Spruance |
Early warning enabled defensive preparations |
| Nighttime Pursuit | 1. Chase retreating fleet 2. Protect Saipan 3. Limited strike |
Limited strike (June 20) | - Fuel constraints - Night landing risks - Prioritize invasion security |
80 US aircraft lost to ditching; Shōkaku sunk |
| Japanese Air Tactics | 1. Coordinated strikes 2. Decoy waves 3. Kamikaze attacks |
Multiple uncoordinated waves | - Pilot inexperience - Radar detection issues - Fuel limitations |
US Combat Air Patrol/CIC dominated airspace |
| US Battle Analysis | 1. Aggressive follow-up 2. Consolidate gains 3. Fuel conservation |
Consolidate and protect beachhead | - Logistics constraints - Preserve carrier strength - Mission priority |
Controversy but preserved strategic initiative |
Key Takeaways
- Technological Edge Drives Success: The United States advantage in aircraft, radar, and anti-aircraft systems was decisive. Modern militaries must prioritize innovation and integration of advanced technologies.
- Training Outweighs Numbers: The disparity between U.S. and Japanese pilots underscores the importance of rigorous, sustained training programs to build a skilled force.
- Coordination Enhances Effectiveness: Task Force 58’s integrated defense—radar, fighters, and anti-aircraft fire—demonstrated the power of coordinated operations. Clear command structures and communication are critical.
- Adaptability Saves Lives: Mitscher’s night recovery decision prioritized human lives, showing that flexible leadership can mitigate risks in crises.
- Logistics Win Wars: The U.S. ability to replace losses and maintain supply lines contrasted with Japan’s depletion, highlighting the importance of industrial and logistical capacity.
- Strategic Alignment Prevents Overreach: Spruance’s focus on protecting Saipan, rather than chasing Ozawa, ensured mission success, emphasizing the need to align tactics with objectives.
- Underestimating the Enemy Courts Disaster: Japan’s misjudgments about U.S. capabilities led to catastrophic losses, a warning for planners to avoid hubris.
- Submarine Warfare’s Hidden Impact: The sinkings of Taiho and Shokaku underscore submarines’ strategic value, often underappreciated in naval planning.
| Battle | U.S. Casualties | Japanese Casualties | Civilian Deaths |
|---|---|---|---|
| Guadalcanal (1942–1943) | 7,100 killed, 7,789 wounded | 19,200 killed | Minimal |
| Makin (1943) | 768 killed (66 ground, 702 naval) | 700+ killed | 399 Korean laborers |
| Tarawa (1943) | 1,696 killed (including 84 died of wounds) | 4,690 killed | 1,071 Korean laborers |
| Saipan (1944) | 3,426 killed, 10,364 wounded | 29,000 killed | 10,000–22,000 |
| Iwo Jima (1945) | 6,821 killed, 19,217 wounded | 20,703 killed | Minimal |
| Okinawa (1945) | 49,151 (including 12,520 killed or missing) | Over 90,000 killed | 100,000–150,000 |
final thoughts on phillippine sea
The Battle of the Philippine Sea was a pivotal moment that reshaped World War II’s Pacific Theater. For the United States, it was a triumph of preparation, technology, and leadership, securing the Marianas and paving the way for Japan’s defeat. For Japan, it was a devastating blow that exposed its strategic and material weaknesses, marking the end of its naval air power. The battle’s legacy, preserved in accounts like Morison’s *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* and Japanese records like Sakai’s *Samurai!*, underscores the human and strategic costs of war. For the Fleet of Freedom Project, this battle exemplifies the U.S. Navy’s resilience and ingenuity, offering lessons in adaptability, coordination, and foresight that resonate beyond the seas of 1944. As we honor the sacrifices of both sides, we are reminded that victory in conflict demands not just strength, but wisdom and unity of purpose.